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As indicated by the literature, leader behaviors, salient manage-
ment practices (management by objectives and compensation prac-
tices), organizational structure, and organizational culture were
chosen as the dimensions with the greatest impact on
business/competitive strategy implementation. So as not to over-
generalize, business level strategies were collapsed into two –
retrenchment and growth. For similar reasons, the competitive
strategy schema was simplified in such a way that competition only
on the basis of price and innovation was retained. Informed by rel-
evant literature and case studies, implementation guidelines were
crafted that appear to have considerable practical utility. 
INTRODUCTION
Both academic and practitioner alike tell us that in the U.S. it is not inad-
equate strategizing and decision making that are the problem, but flawed imple-
mentation. For example, H. Igor Ansoff (1988), a well-known strategic schol-
ar, states: “It is no trick to formulate strategy; the problem is to make it work.”
U.S. automobile executives conclude: “We strategize beautifully, we imple-
ment pathetically” (“Detroit Downer”…1991). Gen. Omar Bradley observed:
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“Drawing the plan is 10% of the job; seeing that plan through is the other 90%.”
Napoleon Bonaparte went so far as to say:  “The art of war is simple; every-
thing is a matter of execution” (Bevin, 1993). Floyd & Wooldridge (1992: 27)
go on to say: 
A frequent complaint of senior executives is that middle and oper-
ating managers fail to take the actions necessary to implement strat-
egy. As one top manager told us: ‘It’s been rather easy for us to
decide where we wanted to go. The hard part is to get the organi-
zation to act on the new priorities.’
Systems theory informs us that all the parts must fit properly for the sys-
tem to work as intended. The concept of fit in an organizational context began
receiving widespread attention with the publication of Strategy and Structure
(1962) by Alfred Chandler, who argued largely on inductive and experiential
grounds that a firm’s strategy, its structure, and its managerial processes have
to “fit” with one another. The work of Burns and Stalker (1961) and Woodward
(1965) further legitimized the concept of fit by demonstrating the relationship
between organizational performance and how well structure, technology, and
human resources support each other. Perhaps, it is the lack of fit that in part
accounts for such a poor record of strategy diversification via acquisition
(Porter, 1987).
A FIT BETWEEN HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES           
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
More recently, a number of scholars advanced the proposition that human
resources can provide a source of sustained competitive advantage through a
linkage between certain organizational variables, such as human resource man-
agement practices, and organizational performance (Arthur, 1994; Cutcher-
Gershenfeld, 1991; Huselid, 1995; Huselid & Becker, 1996; MacDuffie, 1995;
Schuler & Jackson, 1987).
Recognizing the complexity of organizational linkages, some researchers
have distinguished not only between two types of fit (Baird & Meshoulam,
1988), but also between two kinds of human resource practices (Huselid,
Jackson & Schuler, 1997).  Internal fit refers to the degree to which human
resource practices complement and support each other, while external fit refers
to the extent that human resource management components fit the develop-
mental stage of the organization. Technical human resource policies and prac-
tices refer to traditional personnel functions, while strategic human resource
activities refer to such concepts as team-based job designs, flexible workforces,
quality improvement practices, employee empowerment, studies designed to
diagnose a firm’s strategic needs, and development of talent needed to execute
the organization’s competitive strategy and achieve operational goals.
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Venkatraman (1989) goes on to identify six perspectives of fit: Fit as modera-
tion; fit as mediation; fit as matching; fit as gestalts; fit as profile deviation; and
fit as co-variation.  Furthermore, each type of fit requires its own methodology.
A MORE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO FIT
Justifying Choices of Variables
Informed by the literature, the author decided to align critical leader
behaviors, salient management practices, organizational structure, and organi-
zational culture with the business/competitive strategies that an organization
wishes to pursue. Nohria, Joyce & Roberson, (2003) demonstrated empirically
that companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled at what they call
the four primary management practices:  Strategy, execution, culture, and struc-
ture. And they supplemented their skill in those four areas with a mastery of any
two out of four secondary management practices:  Talent, innovation, leader-
ship, and mergers and partnerships. Collins (2001), while identifying the pri-
macy of having top-notch people, also stressed the importance of developing a
viable business model (strategy). From then on, Collins (2001) pointed out that
perseverance is crucial as well, and part and parcel of perseverance is the dis-
cipline to confront unpleasant tasks and difficult situations; all the while per-
sisting in the development of solutions without losing faith.
Locke et al. (1980) state: “In the history of industrial-organizational psy-
chology, only four methods of motivating employee performance have received
systematic attention by researchers. These are [in order of importance]: Money,
goal setting, job enrichment, and participation.” Consequently, compensation
schemes, management by objectives (MBO), and leader behaviors absolutely
need to be considered. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, scholars have
identified some time ago organizational structure as an important organization-
al variable to consider. More recently, organizational culture has been high-
lighted as a significant determinant of organizational performance (Schwartz &
Davis, 1981).
The first set, including leader behaviors and critical management prac-
tices such as management by objectives (MBO) and compensation strategies, is
relatively easy to change in the short-run. The variables in the second set are
also important, but tend to be far more difficult (or less appropriate) to change
in the short term, such as the nature of the organization’s structure, culture, and
quality of its people. While organizational structure can be changed in the
short-term, the disruption that results from major reorganization makes fre-
quent use of this device undesirable. A substantial amount of research suggests
that major changes in culture and quality of human resources can take several
years of constant effort (Schwartz & Davis, 1981). It appears that the alignment
approach such as the one suggested here is being put to practice by Michael
Beer and Russell A. Eisenstat in their capacity as consultants (Ross, 2002).
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What Is Strategy?
While Strategy has been organized in many ways, at the strategic busi-
ness unit level it has been defined here as a plan, written or otherwise, that con-
tains an organizational mission or purpose and the means for attaining that pur-
pose. So far as the business purpose or mission is concerned, a collapsed ver-
sion of Glueck’s (1976) model (see endnote 1), viz., growth and retrenchment,
has been selected. To accommodate the competitive advantage aspects of strat-
egy or the means of attaining the business purpose, a simplified variant of
Porter’s (1985) approach (see endnote 2) has been adopted, viz., cost leadership
and one type of differentiation, and that is innovation. Breaking out quality as
a separate component of Porter’s (1985) differentiation competitive strategy
has been omitted, for if we have learned anything from the Japanese over the
past quarter of a century, it is the importance of quality regardless of the com-
petitive strategy that a firm selects.
Even companies competing at the lower end of the product spectrum
must appreciate the primacy of quality and provide it to customers. An excel-
lent example is the Saturn line of automobiles. Even though Saturn is a low-
cost alternative, on quality it frequently ranks alongside the top imports on
owner surveys recognized by the industry.  Furthermore, we must take care not
to confuse luxury with quality. While a Rolls Royce has luxury, both have qual-
ity. Trying to align the critical variables that have been identified with the fully
elaborated, original versions of Glueck’s (1976) and Porter’s (1985) paradigms
would constitute an unsupportable stretch at this juncture of the state of the art.  
Perhaps less harm is done by this simplification than appears at first
blush, since managing stability and growth, while challenging enough, typical-
ly does not call for the kind of gut-wrenching decisions that are required when
pursuing retrenchment/turnaround strategies – the kind of decisions that dis-
tinctly conflict with self-interest; thereby making them unlikely to be made by
democratic processes. For example, when pursuing retrenchment/turnaround
strategies, managers need to be replaced, employees must be terminated, and
many disruptions to customary practices necessitated (Muczyk & Steel, 1998).
Nexus Between Leadership and Strategy
Although numerous studies link personal characteristics of managers,
managerial skills, managerial experience, and managerial actions with strategy
implementation, there is a relative paucity of research connecting leader behav-
iors and organizational systems to strategy implementation. The exception is
the work of Wooldridge & Floyd (1990) that demonstrates that involving mid-
dle-level managers in strategy formation is associated with organizational per-
formance. Just as importantly, they present a practical approach for closing the
gap between strategy development and execution (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992).  
Both experience and research strongly suggest that a connection exists
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between strategy and leadership. Reginald H. Jones, former CEO of General
Electric, noted some time ago: “When we classified…[our]…businesses, and
when we realized that they were going to have quite different missions, we also
realized we had to have quite different people running them” (Schuler &
Jackson, 1987). Hofer & Schendel (1978) also observed that in moving from a
growth to a turnaround strategy, or from a hold-and- defend to a divestment
strategy, managerial behaviors should change appropriately.  Herbert &
Deresky (1987) found that even the implementation of different organizational
strategies (i.e., develop, stabilize, and turnaround) calls for general managers
with different sets of managerial actions, skills, experience, and behaviors.
Gupta & Govindarajan (1984) also discovered a relationship between strategic
intentions (i.e., build, hold, harvest) and managerial actions and skills. Others
have discerned important interactions between compensation and competitive
strategies (Muczyk, 1988) and between compensation and organizational cul-
ture (Kerr & Slocum, 1987). Schuler & Jackson (1987) highlight the relation-
ship between compensation and competitive strategy with a quote from Peter
Drucker:
I myself made this mistake [thinking that you can truly innovate within
the existing operating unit] 30 years ago when I was a consultant on the first
major organizational change in American history, the General Electric reorgan-
ization of the early 1950s. I advised top management, and they accepted it, that
the general managers would be responsible for current operations as well as for
managing tomorrow. At the same time, we worked out one of the first system-
atic compensation plans, and the whole idea of paying people on the basis of
their performance in the preceding year came out of that. The result of it was
that for ten years General Electric totally lost its capacity to innovate, simply
because tomorrow produces costs for ten years and no return. So, the general
manager – not only out of concern for himself but also out of concern for his
group – postponed spending any money for innovation. It was only when the
company dropped this compensation plan and at the same time organized the
search for the truly new, not just for improvement outside the existing business,
that GE recovered its innovative capacity, and brilliantly. Many companies go
after this new and slight today and soon find they have neither.
Critical Leader Behaviors – Participation and Direction
For better or for worse, when it comes to leadership theories, there is an
embarrassment of riches. The Muczyk/Reimann (1987) mid-range leadership
framework was selected, since it is a serious attempt at reconciling many of the
mid-range leadership theories. According to their model, the aspects of leader
behavior most relevant to the implementation of different strategies appear to
be those that concern themselves with 1) the decisions managers make and 2)
the way these decisions are then executed. The set of leader behaviors known
as participative management is primarily associated with decision-making. A
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less familiar dimension of leader behavior is principally concerned with exe-
cuting decisions, once they have been made. This is the dimension of leader
direction or follow-up (Muczyk/Reimann, 1987).
Participatory management or leadership is typically defined in terms of
the degree to which employees are involved in significant day-to-day, work-
related decisions.  However, the participation of employees in making decisions
is a separate issue from the amount of direction that a leader provides in exe-
cuting those decisions. Thus, a leader can be participatory or democratic by
consulting employees during the decision making phase, yet still be directive
by following up closely on progress toward the ends that have been mutually
decided.
By combining the extreme points on the two situational continua – par-
ticipation and direction – the result is four “pure” patterns of leader behavior
shown in Exhibit 1. 
— The directive autocrat makes decisions unilaterally and also supervis-
es the activities of subordinates very closely.
— The permissive autocrat still makes decisions alone, but permits fol-
lowers a great deal of latitude in accomplishing their delegated tasks.
— The directive democrat invites participation from subordinates in deci-
sion making but continues to supervise employees very closely to
make certain they carry out their democratically assigned tasks prop-
erly.
— The permissive democrat allows subordinates to participate in deci-
sion making, as well as to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in execut-
ing the decisions.
Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan could be included in the
permissive autocrat category. Both men established a national agenda, sur-
rounded themselves with people they trusted, and delegated the rest. However,
for delegation to work well, the delegatee must keep the delegator completely
informed. President Roosevelt kept himself informed, while President Reagan
did not; and for this leadership flaw, President Reagan paid with the Iran-
Contra Affair (Dunham & Pierce, 1989: 385). President Jimmy Carter, a direc-
tive democrat, spent much oh his time on policy details. That is to say, he got
into the weeds on any issue that had technical content. This turned out to be an
inappropriate leadership style for the CEO of such a large and complex enter-
prise as the United States of America. 
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While the permissive democrat leadership style, with its generous doses
of subordinate participation accompanied by large measures of autonomy, is the
distal state of the leadership evolutionary process, we should not be beguiled by
the virtual stranglehold that participative leadership has maintained over popu-
lar belief systems since the end of WW II. Surely, the bulk of U.S. organiza-
tions are hardly representative of the handful of “excellent” companies known
to us by name that prosper under participative and permissive management
styles. Until these enterprises are transformed into “excellent” companies, they
need a leadership style that is more suited to their difficult circumstances
(Muczyk & Reimann, 1987). After all, the review of the participation research
by Locke et al. (1980) indicates that participation in decision making is the least
effective way of motivating employees of the four most popular managerial
approaches studied.
We often lose sight of the fact that the directive autocrat is not some mis-
anthrope or ogre, but merely a person who is paid to make the important deci-
sions, set the salient goals, and direct subordinates along the way – especially
in a crisis, when subordinates tend to rally around a decisive leader. While there
is agreement that more power equalization exists in organizations now than
ever before, and that in all likelihood the “zone of indifference” is shrinking,
nevertheless, most employees still concede to their superior the right to make
decisions and set goals, as well as the authority to direct the process leading to
those results. So long as the decisions and goals are considered by subordinates
as legitimate and reasonable, and the subordinates are treated with courtesy,
dignity, and respect, the autocratic and directive supervisor, manager, or exec-
utive is received much better by subordinates than management literature – aca-
demic and practitioner alike – would have us believe. A caveat is in order, how-
Exhibit 1
Types of Leader Behaviors
Degree of Participation in Decision Making
Low High
Directive Directive 
High Autocrat Democrat
Amount of
Leader
Direction
Permissive Permissive
Low Autocrat Democrat
Source: Muczyk, J. P. & Reimann, B. C. 1987. “The Case for Directive
Leadership,”  Executive, 1, 304.
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ever, regarding this leadership style. For obvious reasons, “directive/autocrats”
normally do not groom successors very well, and this legacy can lead to a suc-
cession crisis.
Leading Change
It is difficult to overestimate the prepotency of change as the principal
driving force of contemporary and future organizations, and the necessity of
leaders to respond appropriately to the radical changes that are buffeting organ-
izations and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Consequently,
leading change is becoming increasingly more important. Thus, Yukl, Gordon
& Taber (2002) have included leading change with task and relations as vital
leadership behavior dimensions. Therefore, such activities as monitoring the
external environment, envisioning change, encouraging innovative thinking,
and taking personal risks to implement change should occupy more of the lead-
ers time, especially in companies facing a dynamic environment (Yukl, Gordon
& Taber, 2002).
In Mintzberg’s (1973) formulation, however, leading change appears to
this author to be another managerial role heavily influenced by contextual
forces; as opposed to being an essential aspect of the leadership role. In any
case, the three most successful strategies for introducing change are: 1)
Attempting the change on a trial basis as a pilot program; 2) involving the
employees in the change from the beginning; 3) making certain that timely and
accurate two-way communication takes place. In the final analysis, it is the trust
level that determines the employees’ attitude toward change.
Certainly, more and more successful organizations tend to anticipate
and embrace change, foster a participative culture, and organize hordes of
workers into more productive, smaller work teams. Nevertheless, in today’s
intensely competitive world, a number of floundering firms still need to be
transformed quickly into lean, growth- driven, performance-based enterprises
with global perspectives. And at times these transformations must be driven by
autocratic and directive CEOs and their key subordinates because of the hard
decisions that must be made.
Management by Objectives (MBO)
An important prerequisite to effective implementation is a mechanism by
which employee behaviors are ultimately linked to strategic goals. Such a
device is management by objectives, providing it is synchronized with prevail-
ing leadership styles.  MBO is also a key instrumentality for providing direc-
tion and impetus – key elements of leadership. Moreover, MBO is quite useful
so far as performance appraisals and compensation practices are concerned,
especially for managers and executives.      MBO was selected not only because
it fills the bill, but also because in its essentials it is enduring, even though
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under different names (Gibson & Tesone, 2001).  Ideally, the MBO process
involves five distinct phases: 1) Goal setting, 2) action planning, 3) periodic
reviews, 4) performance appraisal on the basis of degree of goal attainment, and
5) rewarding organizational members in accordance with degree of goal diffi-
culty and attainment whenever possible. The participation continuum is affili-
ated primarily with the goal-setting phase, while the direction dimension focus-
es on the goal attainment phases.
Thus, MBO can be an important management tool for eliciting the spe-
cific actions required for the execution of a particular business strategy. MBO
is also an important complement to the leadership role that a manager is expect-
ed to exercise. Consequently, it is vital to harmonize MBO with crucial leader-
ship dimensions such as subordinate participation and leader direction (Muczyk
& Reimann, 1989). The circumstances that warrant directive autocrat leader-
ship also dictate autocratic and directive MBO. In like manner, permissive
democrats logically should employ democratic and permissive MBO, etc. See
Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2
MBO Genotypes
Extensive No subordinate 
subordinate participation in
participation goal setting    
in goal setting goal setting
High supervisor
involvement in
action planning, Democratic Autocratic
frequent review, and and
and supervisor- Directive MBO Directive MBO
dominated appraisal
Little supervisor
involvement in
action planning, Democratic Autocratic
infrequent review, and and
and self-appraisal Permissive MBO Permissive MBO
Source: Muczyk, J. P. & Reimann, B. C. 1989. “MBO as a Complement to
Effective Leadership,”  Executive, 3, 135.
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A properly implemented MBO program not only ties strategic goals to
employees’ objectives and behaviors, but also connects goal attainment to per-
formance evaluation and the organization’s reward structure: thereby creating
the necessary motivational, planning, and control conditions for individual and
organizational success. Moreover, managing employees with properly set
goals, after monetary incentives, is the second most effective method of moti-
vating employees; and in conjunction with monetary incentives, constitutes an
even more powerful motivational approach (Locke et al., 1980). Exhibit 3 illus-
trates the management process by which all this is done. However, for MBO to
realize its full potential, it needs top-management commitment, i.e., enthusias-
tic support and involvement of the entire chain of command, especially the top
echelons.  Although MBO implementation needs to start at the top, it should be
a push and pull process the rest of the way, rather than exclusively top down or
bottom up. Research indicates that when top-management commitment was
high, the average gain in productivity was 56%. When commitment was low,
the average gain in productivity was only 6% (Rodgers & Hunter, 1991).
Exhibit 3
The Management of Performance Model
Phase “A” Phase “B” Phase “C” Phase “D” Phase “E”
Clearly Clearly Training Measuring Creating a
Communicating Communicating Subordinates Results Strong
Expectations by Activities and to Execute (Degree to Connection 
Setting Goals Behaviors that Properly Which Goals Between 
and Objectives Lead to the Activities Established Rewards and
Attainment of and Behaviors in Phase “A” Performance 
Goals and Specified in Are Attained as Measured
Objectives Phase “B” and Frequency by Phase “D”
of Occurrence
of Behaviors
Specified in 
Phase “B” is 
Recorded)
Source: Muczyk, J. P. 1988. “The Strategic Role of Compensation,” Human
Resource Planning, 11, 228.
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It should be noted that for goals to regulate performance effectively, feed-
back or knowledge of results in relation to one’s goal is necessary. Put simply,
individual employees need some means of keeping track of their progress
(Erez, 1977). Stated still another way, most employees will do what is meas-
ured and rewarded. The feedback loops in the “management of performance
model” of Exhibit 3 satisfy this important condition.
Compensation Strategies
Kerr (1975) observed some years ago that: “Whether dealing with mon-
keys, rats or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that most organ-
isms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek
to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of
activities not rewarded. The extent to which this occurs of course will depend
on the perceived attractiveness of the rewards offered, but neither operant nor
expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion.” 
Lawler (1984) identifies five factors related to efficiency and effective-
ness of strategy implementation that are influenced by organizational reward
systems: 1) Attraction and retention of personnel; 2) motivation; 3) organiza-
tional culture; 4) organizational structure; and 5) cost. Hence, it is necessary to
demonstrate how congruence between rewards and the other organizational
variables that are instrumental to strategy implementation can be attained.
Muczyk (1988) concluded that the U.S. has become an “instrumental”
culture; and it is crucial in such a culture for employees to be convinced that
their effort leads to performance and performance, in turn, leads to valued
rewards. In a monetized, industrial society, money takes on the role of a gener-
alized reinforcer. Because of its utilitarian as well as its symbolic value, money
serves as a reward for most behaviors, for most people, most of the time.
Therefore, instituting performance-based pay systems in U.S. organizations is
imperative, since connecting monetary rewards to performance appears to be
most effective way of motivating employees (Locke et al., 1980).
However, the relationship between performance and rewards is quite
complex.  Different business/competitive strategies supported by appropriate
organizational cultures intervene between organizational goal attainment and
the compensation mix that the organization selects. In other words, there needs
to be congruence between strategies that are being pursued, organizational
structure, organizational cultures that support these strategies, and reward sys-
tems that elicit and maintain behaviors that are consonant with the selected
business/competitive strategies.
At the broadest level, we can classify compensation as either related to
organizational membership or to performance. Indirect compensation (fringe
benefits) is intended to motivate individuals to join and remain with the organ-
ization. Indirect compensation is not intended to motivate employees to per-
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form at higher levels, and no one should be surprised that it doesn’t. Indirect
compensation can be fixed or presented in a cafeteria-style format.
Pay-for-performance is predicated either on the basis of output or the
value to the organization of the job that an occupant holds. The differences
between the two methods need not imply that the connection between per-
formance and rewards is necessarily greater when pay is based on output as
opposed to one’s job. In those instances when the output standards are low and
the pay rates per unit are excessive, the nexus between performance and
rewards is weak. On the other hand, the nexus between performance and
rewards is quite strong in those organizations that pay on the basis of the job
one holds, but grant annual or semi-annual merit increases as the result of per-
formance differentials captured by reliable and valid performance appraisals.    
When the connection between performance and compensation is weak or
absent, regardless of whether or not the ostensible pay scheme is for output
employees produce or the worth of the jobs they occupy, then the organization
is paying for attendance instead of performance. In fact, performance appraisals
are the Achilles heel of compensation systems in many organizations, since too
often they do not discriminate in a significant way between mediocre, average,
and superior performance as the result of such ubiquitous performance apprais-
al errors as central tendency and excessive leniency (Muczyk & Gable, 1987).
The result is that in too many cases the superior performers are not rewarded in
a manner that is proportional to their contributions. And if they experience such
an inequity for a protracted period, then they could very well become demoti-
vated. These constitute additional reasons for a properly implemented MBO
system.
Another compensation scheme has surfaced recently, which relates com-
pensation to the number of skills an employee has acquired or the number of
tasks he/she has mastered. These schemes are at times referred to as “learn and
earn” plans. Such a compensation policy requires a leap of faith, since the num-
ber of skills one has acquired or the number of tasks one has mastered isn’t nec-
essarily related to either output or the worth to the employer of the job the
employee is holding. On the other hand, it is argued by proponents of pay-for-
knowledge that the added skills give the organization greater flexibility, permit
it to operate leaner, and make the employee that much more valuable. An exten-
sion of this compensation strategy takes into consideration the employee’s for-
mal educational attainment levels, variety and richness of experience, patents
held, reputation among peers and in professional organizations, and the role
that was played by the employee in the development of successful products –
all proxies for innovation.
Since creating the strongest nexus between performance and rewards is
vital in an “instrumental” culture, firms should employ individual and group
incentive plans to the extent practicable. Also, whenever applicable, organiza-
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tion-wide gainsharing plans such as the Scanlon Plan, the Rucker Share-of-
Production Plan, and Improshare are recommended. Profit sharing plans should
receive careful consideration as well.
Moderating the preoccupation with short-term performance metrics, a
hallmark of an “instrumental” culture, is critical as well. Therefore, deferred
compensation for managers and executives tied to intermediate and long-term
measures of success should be encouraged, and the board of directors has a spe-
cial obligation to devise meaningful intermediate and long-term performance
indicators. Stock options have their place but also their limitations. In a period
of “irrational exuberance,” the stock price may very well be unrelated to the
contribution of executives; thereby constituting a serendipitous windfall.
Placing a dollar ceiling on the amount that an executive can keep would deal
with that problem. Preventing the recipient from exercising the stock options
for a significant period of time is another alternative.
One of the best ways to create a beneficial motivational climate is to cre-
ate a sense of ownership best reflected by the motto, “everyone a capitalist.”
Toward that end, each employee should be given ample opportunity and
encouragement to purchase the stock of the company, which would be bought
back at employment termination time. Lincoln Electric provides an excellent
example of a powerful motivational climate. Even though more than half of the
workers at Lincoln Electric are paid on the basis of an incentive plan, the annu-
al bonus (which is typically as large as regular annual earnings) is based on a
performance appraisal that considers the following performance dimensions: 1)
Ideas and cooperation, 2) output, 3) ability to work without supervision, and 4)
work quality (Muczyk, 1988).
Organizational Structure of Core Technology
Burns & Stalker (1961) identified two distinct types of organizations –
one they called “mechanistic” and the other “organic.” The former is highly
bureaucratic, quite rigid, and responds slowly to change, while the latter is very
flexible, fluid and responsive. While in actuality very few organizations are
pure organic or pure mechanistic, most organizations fall on a continuum
between these extreme points.  Clearly a structure that tends toward organic
would be more suited to the implementation of an innovation strategy, while a
structure tending toward mechanistic would better accommodate the mass pro-
duction of items whose basic composition and methods of production change
infrequently. See Exhibit 4. It does not appear that a more elaborate nexus
between structure and strategy is warranted at this time.
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Network organizations. In an intensely competitive global economy, in
order to prosper firms are compelled at times to acquire strategic business units
that are misaligned with the salient characteristics of the parent company. One
way to deal with the alignment issue is to rely on the concept of a network
organization. This organization structure differs from the more traditional types
in the following ways:
— Network organizations define their core competence and contract the
remaining functions. That is, they use the combined assets of several
firms located at various points along the value chain.
— Network organizations place a greater reliance on market mechanisms
than administrative processes to regulate resource flows. These are
not, however, “at arm’s length relationships. The interdependence, in
fact, resembles the Japanese “keiretsu.” 
Exhibit 4
Characteristics of Mechanistic and Organic Structures
MECHANISTIC CHARACTERISTICS ORGANIC
Functional Division of Labor Job Enlargement  
Specialization or and Job Enrichment
Departmentalization
by Function 
Clearly Defined Hierarchy of Decentralized
and Centralized Authority and Participative 
Formal and Jobs and Flexible
Standardized Procedures    
Primarily Economic Motivation Both Economic 
and Psychological 
Authoritarian Leadership Style Democratic 
Formal and Group Relations Informal and Personal 
Impersonal 
Vertical and Communications Vertical, lateral,                 
Directive diagonal and
consultative 
Source: Adapted from Gannon, M. J. 1970.  Organizational Behavior: A
Managerial and Organizational Perspective, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and
Co.), 75.
Muczyk
67
— Network organizations expect a proactive role among participants that
enhances the final product or service rather than just fulfilling a con-
tract to the letter. Those members of the network that are reluctant to
go the extra mile lose their position (Miles & Snow, 1978).
By relying on a network structure, the alignment challenges disappear for
everything but the core competency because they have been outsourced, there-
by becoming someone else’s problem. Historically, parent organizations have
dealt with alignment issues by making subsidiaries or divisions independent so
long as their performance is satisfactory.  In other words, the holding company
merely managed the financial flows of its conglomeration. When performance
proved unacceptable, top leadership of the subsidiary or division was replaced.
If that did not work, then the subsidiary or division was disposed of.
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture has been defined as shared beliefs, expectations,
and values held by members of a given organization, and to which all new-
comers must adjust through the socialization process, if they wish to prosper
(Greenberg & Baron, 1993). Since corporate culture is often a key to the suc-
cess or failure of business strategies, it should not be ignored. The significance
of organizational culture is illustrated by the following example. Mr. Horst W.
Schroeder, President of Kellogg, was terminated by Mr. William E. LaMothe,
Kellogg Chairman and CEO. The reason given was a failure of management
“chemistry.” Mr. Schroeder started out with Kellogg in West Germany as a con-
troller, and later managed Kellogg’s European operations, where he accumulat-
ed impressive results. But in Battle Creek, Michigan, Mr. Schroeder’s col-
leagues described him as a strong-willed, even imperious, autocratic European.
This style conflicted drastically with Kellogg’s small town family culture that
stressed teamwork, subordinate involvement, and sharing credit with others.
Clearly, the contrast between Kellogg’s culture and Mr. Schroeder’s leadership
style was too great to overcome, especially when the performance of the firm
began slipping (Gibson, 1989b).
Many observers believe that the cultural differences between Daimler’s
“exclusive” culture and Chrysler’s “strategic” culture made the
Daimler/Chrysler merger more difficult than it needed to be. Daimler’s leader-
ship must have hoped that the cultural differences between the two partners
would somehow sort themselves out, but they did not. Both companies would
have been better off had they planned for a cultural alignment up front (Schuler
& Jackson, 2001). Further evidence supporting the power of organizational cul-
ture has been provided by Cameron & Quinn (1999), who developed an ana-
lytic process based on their competing values framework that predicts the suc-
cess of mergers with considerable accuracy.
The value-based classification of culture adopted here is the one devised
by Reimann & Wiener (1988). The two-by-two schema is based on the focus of
Journal of Comparative International Management    7:1
68
Exhibit 5
Generic Corporate Culture Types
Source of Values
Charismatic Organizational
Leadership Traditions
Entrepreneurial Strategic
Functional   
(External, Short-Term) (External, Long-Term) 
Focus
of 
Values
Chauvinistic Exclusive
Elitist
(Internal, Short-Term) (Internal, Long-Term)
Source: Reimann, B. C. & Wiener, Y. 1988. “Avoiding the Elitist Trap,”
Business Horizons, March-April, 39. See endnote 3 for an alternative schema.
“Entrepreneurial” culture is the result of the interaction of charismatic
leadership and a functional focus. Such a culture encourages a market/customer
orientation, but could evaporate quickly if something were to happen to the
founding entrepreneur. A good example of “entrepreneurial” culture is the
Japanese manufacturer of robots and computerized numerical controls, Fanuc.
Fanuc is not only preeminent in its field, but is the Japanese company with the
highest profits. Mr. Seiuemon Inaba, who leads the company, does not smoke;
therefore no one smokes. He demands that his orders are followed to the letter,
since he believes that “a wise dictator is better than an unwise democracy.” Mr.
Inaba does not wish his scientists and engineers to read the latest technical
books and journal articles lest their creativity be encumbered by what is known.
He is known as the “yellow Kaiser of Mt. Fuji” after the imperial yellow color
that he imposed on everything in the firm, including uniforms (Bylinsky, 1987).
“Strategic” culture is the result of a functional focus and organizational
traditions.  Such a culture also conduces toward a market/customer orientation,
but the values have been institutionalized. Thus, this culture should be rela-
tively long-lived. “Chauvinistic” culture is produced by the synthesis of elitist
focus and charismatic leadership. It is internally oriented and lacks duration.
The “Exclusive” culture comes about through the fusion of an elitist focus and
values (elitist vs. functional) and the source of values (charismatic leader vs.
organizational traditions). See Exhibit 5. Also, see endnote 3 for an alternative
classification.
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organizational traditions. Hence, while it is internally oriented, it enjoys
longevity.
Just as organizations whose stock-in-trade is innovation need an enabling
structure, so do they require a supportive culture. Ditto for organizations with
competitive strategies, such as low cost. When one superimpose mission-level
strategies, such as retrenchment or growth on top of competitive strategies,
such as price and innovation, the synchronization process becomes even more
challenging.
ALIGNMENT PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SOME
COMMON STRATEGIES
Organizations in deep trouble may need a dose of transformational lead-
ership, which includes four ingredients: 1) inspirational vision; 2) dynamic per-
sonality (charisma); 3) crisis situation; 4) and dramatic acts to bring about the
transformation (Muczyk & Adler, 2002). Clearly, organizations in need of
transformation require a vision, which can be defined as an inspired, long-run
strategy that is not obvious to extant managers and executives until it is
revealed by the transformational leader (Huffman, 2001). Had that not been the
case, the organization would have resuscitated itself without the assistance of a
transformational leader. Certainly, if an organization needs a transformational
leader, it should get one. However, because of the daunting nature of organiza-
tional transformation, such leaders are uncommon.
When examined closely, however, the preponderance of successful lead-
ers build incrementally over time rather than transforming organizations
overnight. Lee Iacocca has at times been described as a transformational leader.
But when one considers how long it took Lee Iacocca to resurrect Chrysler –
with the appreciable assistance of the federal government at that – it would be
more appropriate to describe him as an incremental leader. Moreover, organi-
zations frequently find themselves in trouble because of poor execution, in
which case the solution is improved execution and not a vision.
For the past quarter of a century or so, many outstanding leaders suc-
ceeded by focusing on the fundamentals of management. That is, they created
lean and nimble organizations through redefining the role and size of staff
departments, de-layering hierarchies, continually improving processes and
practices through re-engineering, employing network organizations where
appropriate, empowering employees, establishing a strong connection between
performance and rewards, and placing customers first. It is likely that even bet-
ter performance would result if executives and managers would properly align
key organizational variables with their business/competitive strategies.
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Retrenchment Situations
Facing reality. Most organizational members are unlikely to embrace
decisions and goals if their naked self-interest is at odds with those decisions
and goals. This reality was acknowledged most recently by Muczyk & Steel
(1998), and in the past by Vroom-Jago (1988), Vroom-Yetton (1973), Fiedler
(1967), and Tannenbaum & Schmidt, (1958). But transforming an organization
is frequently accomplished through turnaround and retrenchment strategies,
which, in turn, require doing things in different, unfamiliar, undesirable, and
often painful ways. In other words, the decisions that need to be made and the
goals that must be set, frequently run counter to employee self-interest – e.g.,
managers are replaced, employees are terminated, and many disruptions are
created with respect to traditional policies and practices.
An extreme example is Phelps Dodge, best known as a copper producer.
In order to survive, Phelps Dodge had to adopt draconian measures that can
best be described as “slash-and-burn” tactics.  The firm slashed its workforce
56%, closed inefficient smelters, obtained a 10% pay cut from its salaried
workers, and broke all of its 12 unions by withstanding bitter, violent strikes
that lasted in excess of two years and required intervention by the Arizona
National Guard (Swasy, 1989). The “blitzkrieg” mentality necessary to drasti-
cally restructure a firm quickly simply cannot be produced by democratic and
permissive practices.
Mintzberg (1984) recognized all along the need for autocratic leadership
for retrenchment situations because this strategy usually necessitates forming
new structures, dismissing some existing employees, hiring new people, and
providing direction for a renewal process—all very difficult decisions indeed
that can be made only by the top executive. Nevertheless, even though only the
CEO can make timely decisions to downsize, it may still be advisable to seek
inputs from subordinates at various stages about how best to downsize.
In addition, urgency precludes participative methods, which are inherent-
ly time- consuming. To make matters worse, managerial education, until
recently, has neglected the whole topic of how to retreat effectively. Finally, the
retrenchment strategy flies in the face of the “bigger is better” ethic that is firm-
ly ingrained in the U.S. culture and, in turn, has convinced many managers that
being rewarded on the basis of the size of their units and their budgets is the
norm. Thus, only the leader can make these difficult and unpopular decisions
under extreme time pressures.
Case #1. In the unlikely situation where the organization is in trouble
either financially or legally, while the quality of people and management sys-
tems is strong, and competition is on the basis of price; then the prevailing lead-
ership style should be “permissive autocrat” coupled with “autocratic and per-
missive MBO.” Such an organization is likely to retrench, at least for a while,
until a better business model is adopted. Thus, autocratic leadership is recom-
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mended for the difficult decisions that need to be made, but the quality of the
human capital and management systems merits permissive leadership.
Furthermore, compensation should be tied either to output or productivity,
while the culture, to the extent possible, should be “strategic.” To the degree
that a culture is dependent on organizational traditions rather than the current
leader and is functionally oriented, the more reinforcing it is of long-run orga-
nizational success in most instances.
Case #2. In the other unusual scenario where the organization is in trou-
ble, but the quality of people and management systems is strong, and the com-
petitive strategy is one of relying on innovation, the leadership style should also
be “permissive autocrat” in conjunction with “autocratic and permissive
MBO.” The difficult decisions still should be made by the leader. However,
since the employees are capable and sound management systems are in place,
the employees should be permitted considerable discretion in carrying out their
assignments. The leadership style should also rely on leading change through:
Monitoring the external environment; proposing an innovative strategy or new
vision; encouraging innovative thinking; and taking risks to promote necessary
changes. However, compensation should be tied to skills and abilities, with
ample opportunity to establish an equity position, if possible. The culture
should be strategic as well.
It is perfectly legitimate to ask: How can a firm be in trouble while the
quality of its people is high and the management systems are up to the task?
Never before has change marched more briskly than now, as the result of the
globalization of the economy and unprecedented technological innovation. In
such an environment, even talented persons can miss a sea change that could
prove critical to the success of their organization. The classic case is NCR prior
to the solid-state electronic revolution. NCR was basically an electromechani-
cal firm with an enormous investment in highly skilled craftsmen and expen-
sive machines. Obviously, this heavy investment, which the company was
reluctant to abandon, created environmental blinders. The unwillingness to
convert as quickly as possible to the emerging solid-state, point-of-sale termi-
nals forced the company to write off $139 million of obsolete inventory and
posed serious long-term problems for the company. Du Pont lost out to
Celanese when bias-ply tire cords changed from Nylon to polyester. Michelin
bested B.F. Goodrich in the marketplace when radial tires ousted bias-ply tires.
A ‘strategic” culture would have permitted these firms to make the necessary
transition far better than the “exclusive” one that served to obscure the techno-
logical innovations that were obsolescing their products (Foster, 1985).
Moreover, these companies would have been better served had their mangers
devoted more time, energy, and money to leading change.
While it is important for the cost structure of a firm to shrink as the busi-
ness level declines, it is even more so when competition is largely on price,
since the profit margins in this situation are typically thin. For these companies,
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the long-run is the sum of all the short-runs because the company is producing
the same or similar mix of products in a similar manner year after year. And this
objective can be realized by creating a strong nexus between compensation and
productivity or output. Moreover, support employees, such as equipment main-
tenance personnel, should have their compensation tied to the output of the
work groups and/or individuals that they support. Part of the compensation of
the supervisors should also be based on the output of their subordinates.     
Furthermore, indirect compensation (fringe benefits) should contain only
the basics, should be carefully monitored to make certain that it does not get out
of line, and should be only as generous as is required to attract and retain the
kinds of employees that are needed to accomplish the mission of the organiza-
tion and to discourage unionization.  After all, often it is the indirect compen-
sation that is out of control, as opposed to direct compensation.
When the firm is pursuing an innovation strategy, basing remuneration on
traditional, short-term performance indicators, would be counter-productive.
Hence, making compensation a function of innovative behavior and proxies for
innovation, such as skills, abilities, and appropriate experience, is likely to pro-
duce better results.
Case #3. If the organization is in trouble, the quality of people and man-
agement systems is weak, and the competitive strategy is based largely on
price, then the leadership style is “directive autocrat” coupled with “autocratic
and directive MBO;” until such time as the management systems are strength-
ened and the quality of personnel improved. Clearly, the leader should make the
important decisions, set the salient goals, and follow up closely on both.
Furthermore, compensation should be strongly connected to output and/or pro-
ductivity. While perforce the culture may have to be entrepreneurial  until the
turnaround is accomplished, management should begin preparing the organiza-
tion for a strategic  culture in anticipation of a growth environment.
Case #4. If the organization is in trouble, the quality of people and man-
agement systems is weak, and the competitive strategy is predicated on inno-
vation; then the “directive autocrat” leadership style should be reinforced with
“autocratic and directive MBO.” Under this scenario, the highest priority of top
management is to improve the quality of the workforce, since it is difficult to
pursue innovation unless appropriate personnel are in place. Consequently, a
number of existing personnel will in all likelihood need replacing. There should
be a strong nexus between compensation and skills and abilities, with ample
opportunity for employees to acquire significant equity as an added inducement
to align work behavior with competitive strategy. Finally, the culture may need
to be “entrepreneurial,” until such time as the organization is righted.  Needless
to say, leaders in such a situation have an obligation to lead change in a man-
ner prescribed by Yukl, Gordon & Taber, 2002).
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Autocratic leadership in combination with a compatible MBO program is
recommended for Cases #3 & #4 for the same reasons it is recommended for
Cases #1 & #2. However, the directive component is substituted for the per-
missive one in both leadership and MBO, since the quality of people and man-
agement systems is weak.  Hence, the leader must follow up on the execution
or implementation of decisions and the goal attainment process, since it is high-
ly likely that the subordinates will need considerable direction and guidance on
a frequent basis. Once the organization is turned around and remains success-
ful for a period of time, then the organizational traditions that contribute to suc-
cess will transition the culture to a strategic  one. In case #4, leading change
becomes a managerial priority because the firm is relying on an innovation
strategy.
Growth Situations
Case #5. When the organization is doing well, the quality of people and
management systems is strong, and the competitive strategy is based on price,
then the appropriate leadership style is “permissive democrat” supported by a
“democratic and permissive MBO.” Rewards should be tied to output or pro-
ductivity and an opportunity for acquiring some equity should be afforded. The
most appropriate culture would be “strategic.” 
Case #6. In circumstances where the organization is doing well, the qual-
ity of people and management systems is strong, and innovation is the organi-
zation’s selected  strategy, then the recommended leadership style is “permis-
sive democrat” buttressed by “democratic and permissive MBO.”
Compensation should be connected to skills, abilities, and specific innovative
activities; and opportunities for accumulating significant equity positions
should be provided. Such an organization would be well served by an “exclu-
sive” culture.
Democratic and permissive leader behaviors and MBO practices are rec-
ommended for cases #5 and #6 because they embody the necessary conditions
– quality people, sound management systems, and sustained success. For Case
#6, this configuration needs to be pursued in concert with leading change.     
Case #7. When the organization is doing well, the quality of people and
management systems is weak, and the competitive strategy is largely a function
of price, then the leadership style is directive democrat  with augmented by
democratic and directive MBO.  Remuneration should be joined to output or
productivity, and the culture should be strategic.
Case #8. If the organization is not in trouble, the quality of people and
management systems leaves something to be desired, and innovation is the
bread-and-butter of the organization, then the “directive democrat” leadership
style complemented by “democratic and directive MBO” is appropriate.
Rewards should be tied to skills and abilities, as well as to concrete innovative
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Exhibit 6
Recommended Alignment of Key Implementation Factors               
Org.     
Quality of Mission          Leader-     
Org. Systems & or Compet. Org Compen. ship
Healthy? People? Purpose? Based On? Struc. Org. Tied & MBO 
Case Yes No Strong Weak G R Price Innov. M O Cul. To Style
1 x x x x x S O/P P/A
2 x x x x x S S/A P/A@
3 x x x x x S O/P D/A
4 x x x x x EN S/A D/A@ 
5 x x x x x S O/P P/D
6 x x x x x EX O/P P/D@
7 x x x x x S O/P D/D
8 x x x x x EN S/A D/D@
LEGEND:
G = Growth; R= Retrenchment
M = Mechanistic; O = Organic
S = Strategic; EN = Entrepreneurial; EX = Exclusive
O/P = Output/Productivity; S/A = Skills/Abilities 
P/A = Permissive Autocrat; D/A = Directive Autocrat; P/D = Permissive Democrat;
D/D = Directive Democrat
@With heavy emphasis on: 1) Monitoring the external environment; 2) proposing an 
innovative strategy or new vision; 3) encouraging innovative thinking; and 4) taking 
risks to promote necessary changes (Yukl et al., 2002).
Three Special Cases
Entrepreneur dominated. Small and, at times, medium-size companies
often are dominated by the founder, who constitutes the glue that keeps the firm
together and provides it direction. Such firms are seldom run by a “permissive
democrat.” In most instances, the best-case scenario is a “permissive autocrat.”
Moreover, these organizations are typically characterized by either “entrepre-
neurial” or “chauvinistic” cultures. Compensation strategies and core technol-
ogy organizational structures, even in the founder-dominated companies,
should be forged on the basis of the same criteria as in the first eight cases
described above. In these organizations, and when appropriate, it is the founder
who must lead change when appropriate.
However, not all start-up companies are led by “directive autocrats.”
Apple Computer Co., Tandem Computers, and People Express Airlines were
founded by “permissive democrats.” However, at a certain stage of their life
cycle this leadership style became inappropriate, and each firm stumbled badly.
activity. Understandably, the culture should be “entrepreneurial,” until the orga-
nizational members can either be developed or replaced. In addition, leading
change is crucial. For a summary, see Exhibit 6.
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Apple Computer brought in a new leader in time to regain its momentum.
Jimmy Treybig became much more decisive and directive in time to save
Tandem from disaster. But Don Burr refused to change his leadership style, and
after accumulating heavy losses, the company was acquired by Texas Air.     
Providers of critical services. Often, long-standing providers of critical
services such as legal, medical, investment, accounting, and consulting are
characterized by “exclusive” cultures, which ensue when the elitist value ori-
entation of a chauvinistic culture survives its charismatic leader and becomes
institutionalized. The name is derived from an elitist but traditional, club-like
orientation. The leadership style and enabling practices, on the other hand, are
a function of the same forces as in the aforementioned eight cases.
Compensation practices in these organizations, on the other hand, are in part a
function of the amount of business that the member (the senior ones are typi-
cally partners) brings into the organization. Furthermore, one of the important
criteria for being accepted into partnership is evidence that one can bring new
business into the firm. It appears that members of organizations characterized
by exclusive cultures are more likely to believe in their own superiority, and
that leads to a perception of immunity which, at times, encourages unnecessary
risk taking.
Arthur Anderson was very successful for 81 years with an “exclusive”
culture carried over from its founder. However, the desire for impressive
growth in what had become a very competitive industry motivated many part-
ners at Anderson to jettison its elitist values and cater to the wishes of a num-
ber of clients, who, in turn, were pressured to produce impressive earnings and
growth, even if it meant employing questionable means. While the customer
may always be right in many industries, such is not the case with respect to pub-
lic accounting, law, and medicine. The rest is history.
Conglomerates. Conglomerates by definition are comprised of very dif-
ferent strategic business units. Consequently, it is necessary to align the salient
organizational variables identified in this paper with the respective
business/competitive strategies for each strategic business unit in order to real-
ize the maximum capability of each competitive strategy.
SOME EXAMPLE OF HAZARDS ASSOCIATED
WITH MISMATCHES
W. Michael Blumenthal, erstwhile CEO of Unisys, serves as an example
of the hazards associated with a misalignment between critical leader behaviors
and business strategy – turning around a troubled organization. While numer-
ous Unisys executives conceded that a directive leadership style was called for
because the organization was in need of a strong hand running day-to-day oper-
ations, Mr. Blumenthal frequently avoided day-to-day decisions, ignored the
chain-of-command, and spent considerable time on outside interests. Timely
Journal of Comparative International Management    7:1
76
decisions were crucial, yet the committee of ten rather autonomous executives
ensured a slow decision-making process. The result of the inappropriate lead-
ership style was: Loss of momentum, departure of key executives, delays in the
introduction of new products, burdensome inventories, and losses rather than
profits (Carroll, 1989).      Northwest Airlines (NWA) serves as an example of
alignment problems that ensue when two organizations with very different cul-
tures merge. Historically, Northwest Airlines had a “hard-line” culture and a
“directive autocrat” leadership style (Gibson, 1989a & Rose, 1989). Such a
combination served Northwest well when it grew through a low cost competi-
tive strategy, especially when acute competition resulting from deregulation
was buffeting most major airlines. However, as Northwest matured and
acquired Republic Airlines, a firm with a different culture and leadership style,
that type culture and leadership style proved to be more of a liability than an
asset. NWA employees were now ready for more participation and less direc-
tion. Furthermore, combining two different workforces at best is a difficult task,
requiring the ideas, cooperation, and trust of everyone involved. A “directive
autocrat” leadership style, however, tends to stile innovation and create resent-
ment, if not accompanied by a heavy dose of consideration. In the case of
NWA, the problems exacerbated by the mismatch made the firm a candidate for
takeover.
CONCLUSION
Simon’s (1957) concept of “bounded rationality,” by focusing on imper-
fect information as the primary reason why managers “satisfice” rather than
“optimize,” sheds considerable light on why managerial decisions do not nec-
essarily conform to the predictions of the rational economic model. In like man-
ner, the implementation problems caused largely by the misalignment of criti-
cal management factors with chosen business/competitive strategies prevent
the full realization of the fruits that selected business strategies have to offer.
Toward that end an attempt was made to identify the important variables that
need to be aligned with specific business/competitive strategies in order to
fashion coherent implementation guidelines that would enhance the likelihood
of success. Enlightened by the literature – academic and practitioner alike,
including case studies – the author selected leader behaviors, salient manage-
ment practices (management by objectives and compensation practices), orga-
nizational structure, and organizational culture. Others, have focused on such
personality characteristics as risk- taking propensity and on specific functional
skills. The aforementioned variables were then properly aligned with four
retrenchment (two competing on price and two on innovation), situations and
four growth (two competing on price and two on innovation) scenarios.
Three special cases (entrepreneur dominated firms, providers of critical servic-
es, and conglomerates) were also discussed. It is unlikely that much harm
results from the simplification of the business/competitive strategy schemes
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that have been chosen. In any case, more fine-tuning at this stage is unsupport-
able. While this is not the last word on alignment, it is an invitation to others to
complete the process. In the meantime, it is anticipated that this effort makes it
easier for executives and managers to forge effective implementation process-
es to accompany their strategic choices.
ENDNOTES
1. The fully elaborated form of Glueck’s model includes: Growth/invest;
turnaround/restructure; retrench/harvest; and stabilize/maintain. In the case of a diversi-
fied organization, the corporate resource allocation strategy is reflected in the business
mission.
2. Porter’s complete schema includes three generic competitive strategies, which are: Cost
leadership, differentiation, and focus.
3. Hooijberg & Petrock (1993) devised a two-by-two matrix along the dimension of formal
control orientation and forms of attention that corresponds to the Reimann & Wiener
(1988) model, and could be used a well. Their four culture types are: Clan,
Entrepreneurial, Bureaucratic, and Market.
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